her foreign policy of the Good Neighbor 3 . The German ambassador to the United States had formulated this in 1938:
The interest of the United States is and will be the continuence and the support of free international trade, as much as it is possible. Thus Washington inevitably will have to stop the advance of the totalitarian states to a powerful position 4 .
The third interest in this triangle was the Mexican one itself. Traditionally Germany had served as a gap filler in the Mexican economy whenever it was appropriate. For example, German merchants had taken over the export and import of important economic sector goods after the European intervention in Mexico in the 1870's. German bankers supplied the Diaz government with credits and thus enabled him to finance the nationalization of the Mexican railroad system 5 . Hence Mexican governments had always used German interests to play out British or United States interests, in an attempt to gain more space for independent action from these two countries and their economic interests. Already during the First World War, a German government had attempted to exploit these Mexican interests for its own objectives as manifested by the Zimmermann Dispatch. In the future, Mexico would be interested in good relations with Germany, mainly in regard to economic concerns. Thus he considered the predominant task of German policy to be the establishment of a general bilateral trade treaty with Mexico. This would bind Mexico and Germany together for a longer period and at the same time increase the distance between the United States and Mexico. In Rüdf s opinion, no end of the United States-Mexican oil dispute was in sight in the near future. Thus in peace time, Mexico would turn to the United States only in the case of a serious economic or financial crisis. Then the United States could offer immediate economic concessions and buy Mexico's cooperation with financial assistance. A Germany-Mexican bilateral economic treaty should help to avoid this United States-Mexican cooperation. However, due to the proximity to the United States, Germany should never expect an outspoken pro-German attitude from the Mexican government. Also in the future Mexico would avoid any action which could be interpreted as anti-United States or against the Western Hemisphere.
In the event that Germany would become involved in a war, Riidt predicted that the Third Reich could not count on Mexican support or neutrality. Rather Mexico^would turn to the side of the enemy where it could find more economic advantages.
In summary, Riidt saw the economic relationship between Mexico and Germany as being of predominant importance for the future. Furthermore, the existing anti-Americanism in the Mexican society and government played a crucial role for the German objectives. He emphasized using the existing frictions in order to keep Mexico distant from the United States and thus keep the United States policy of the Good Neighbor at stake and weaken the Western Hemisphere 8 .
Only three months after this conference the Second World War began. Contrary to Rüdfs predictions Mexico declared herself as neutral. Further, the following Conference of Havanna did not result in harmful effects to the German economic interests in Latin America and Mexico
9
. Thus the German Ministry of Economy planned to continue the trade with Latin America by means of neutral vessels and European ports. Thus the British blockade would be bypassed.
Although the external conditions in regard to trade had not developed too negatively after the Conference of Panama, the German-Mexican economic relations suffered setback after setback from the outbreak of the war on. The problems arose from inside the Third Reich and its economic problems.
Immediately after the outbreak of the war, the German companies involved cancelled their contracts with their Mexican contractors, mainly in order to renegotiate the payment modus, switching from barter exchange to cash payment 10 . Because of the fact that the German deliveries to Mexico were reembursements for Mexican oil shipments, these cancellations involved the German Economic and Foreign Ministry, as well as the High Command of the German Navy. They all had different and sometimes opposing interests. The Ministry's of Economy primary goal was to concentrate the economic activities, so that the war economy could support the European battle field. The High Command of the Navy fought against the ministry's objectives, fearing to lose Mexico as an important supplier of fuel and oil for the German navy. In the middle of the this tug of war stood the Foreign Ministry, trying to exercise a cohesive foreign policy 11 . These different interests caused a four months long confusion within the German-Mexican economic relations.
Two months after the outbreak of the war, the confusion had reached such a degree that the German Minister to Mexico cabled to Berlin: 1940 the Mexican President Cárdenas publicly welcomed the representative of the Polish exile government in Mexico City, recognized him as legitimate representative of the Polish people and gave his government a diplomatic representation in Mexico City. This could certainly be interpreted as a provocation of Germany which had attacked Poland in the Fall of 1939. However, on the same day, after a protest of the German legation against the president's action, the Minister of Hacienda Suárez visited the German minister in order to clarify the Mexican position. He told Rüdt that Mexico would be a small country, which always would have to be on guard for invasion (i.e. the United States). Therefore, Mexico would have to take a stand against any kind of invasion, as in the Polish case. Suárez explicitly asked Minister Rüdt not to pay too much attention to the Mexican action 25 .
The pattern is obvious. The Mexican minister attempted to excuse the Mexican recognition of the Polish representative by pointing at the United States. Thus, he portrayed the president's action as an indirect protest against any aspirations of groups within the United States to disregard the territorial integrity of a weaker or neutral country. Towards the government of the United States the Mexican recognition appeared as a firm stance against the brutal attack on Poland by Nazi Germany. It could be interpreted as a Mexican support of the Western Hemisphere against the Axis powers. On the public stage Mexico and the Third Reich belonged to ideologically adverse political blocks. Inofficially however, they did everything possible to play down all ideological differences, so that their vital mutual interests, i.e. trade, oil and distance from the United States would not be effected by them.
In this plot the Mexican Foreign Minister and the Mexican President represented the more pro-Western Hemisphere position of Mexico, whereas the Mexican Minister of Hacienda stood for a policy of European-Mexican cooperation. Therefore the two Mexican ministries of Hacienda and Foreign Affairs were not contradictory in regard to Mexico's foreign policy but rather complementary, presenting two faces of one coin. This policy allowed a large amount of flexibility and gave Mexico space to shift back and forth between German and United States support without any great damage.
From this time on, it can be observed that whenever an official Mexican statement related to the Axis powers was made, the German legation afterwards received an unofficial Mexican interpretation, either through personal conversations with Minister Suárez or mutual friends of the German legation and the Mexican ministries. Mexico played the United States card frequently and did everything possible to make the Germans believe how dependent she was on her northern neighbor. Always, the main argument was that the United States were blackmailing Mexico with an intervention. In the published United States records I did not find any documents which can prove the threat of an intervention.
After the fall of France, the United States pressure on Mexico, particularly related to German propaganda activities, increased significantly. President Cárdenas had expressed his sympathy for the French nation and condemned the Italian fascist's attack. Mexican newspapers published his address on the front page 26 . At the same time, Minister Suárez had visited the German legation. Towards the German economic counselor he expressed that he was expecting a soon reestablishment of the trade relations between Mexico and Germany. He hoped that Mexico would favorably satisfy the increasing raw material demands of the future German-controlled Europe. In general he viewed the German victory over France as positive, emphasizing that now Germany would probably attack Great Britain, for which Mexico had no sympathy. In contrast to the disregard of Great Britain, the Mexican people would feel sympathetic towards Germany 27 . In the Fall of 1940, after the election of the new Mexican President Avila Camacho, the Mexican Foreign Ministry approached the German legation, asking to send an ambassador in special mission to the inauguration ceremony in the following December. This would be particularly appreciated by the Mexican government 30 . The German Foreign Ministry reluctantly followed this wish, declaring Minister Rüdt as ambassador in special mission in November.
During the inauguration, to which the United States demonstratively sent Vice President Wallace, Minister Rüdt was acknowledged publicly by the Mexican president and treated extremely well. The newspaper Excelsior even published a special article containing the address of the German Minister and a picture of Minister Rüdt directly above Vice-President Wallace. Minister Rüdt was praised for his excellent address, which had been delivered in Spanish 31 . After the inauguration festivities, several Mexican officials told Rüdt that President Avila Camacho would remain constant, despite demands by the United States to cut down German influence in Mexico. There would be no reason to worry about the future of the GermanMexican colony and the German-Mexican relations 32 .
Certainly, the inauguration had been a success for the position of the German legation and a provocation to the United States embassy in Mexico City. However, the expected end of the war did not come and the Mexican government depended more than ever before on the North American market and cooperation with the United States. Therefore it had to follow the demand for hemispheric solidarity and join the United States policy of the Western Hemisphere. Thus the Mexican press turned completely anti-Third Reich, President Avila Camacho's Pan American Day speech emphasized that no power should be based on fascist bayonettes and finally in April of 1941 Mexico and other Latin American countries seized all German vessels which had remained in their ports 33 .
After the seizure of the ships Minister Riidt had the opportunity to discuss the state of German-Mexican relations with President Avila Camacho. In the conversation Minister Riidt complained about the taken actions, particularly the ship seizures, which he felt contradicted the previously given assurances. In the eyes of the German government Avila Camacho's attacks on Germany could only be interpreted as hostile to the Third Reich. After these complaints Rüdt became more conciliatory and expressed his sympathy for Mexico in regard to the strong pressure of the United States on Mexico.
President Avila Camacho replied in a friendly manner and asked for understanding in case of the vessel seizures. He told Rüdt that Mexico had only acted in order to prevent a threatening takeover of the vessels by the United States, which had planned to use the ships for the supply of the British Navy in the Atlantic. In reality, he emphasized Mexico would not have the slightest interest in German ships. He assured the German minister that Germany would certainly receive compensation after the war. He finished the exchange with the assurance that Mexico would remain neutral, even in case the United States would enter the war. The German colony would have nothing to fear. In order to help the Mexican government's position towards the United States, he asked Rüdt to end all activities which could discredit the presence of the Germans in Mexico 34 . Later, a judge in Vera Cruz confirmed Mexico's indifferent attitude concerning the German vessels. He told Rüdt that the return of the vessels would depend on the outcome of the war. If Germany should win, it would also win the vessels, if it would lose, the vessels would be lost too 35 . The German attack on Russia and the following German defeat put an end to all Mexican speculations about a rapid end to the war and a possible victorious Third Reich.
After examining the Mexican attitude towards the Third Reich during the Second World War, I turn to the German attitude and interest in Mexico. The German government left the conduct of its gard of the Mexican premise of mutual give and take. Thus it is no surprise that Mexico immediately withdrew all exequaturs of German consulates in Mexico and sent the staffs back to Europe 41 . Three days later, the German Foreign Ministry realized its mistake and sent a note to Mexico apologizing for this action and portraying it as a misunderstanding 42 . However, the Mexican government did not change its decision, and the Third Reich lost significant influence and sources of information in Mexico.
The Mexican government successfully killed two birds with one stone by this step. It had shown the German government its limit, while indirectly following the United States demand to close German consulates, thus behaving -as expected -as a good neighbor.
An addittional reason for the German loss of position was lack of support for the German legation by the German ministries. Because of the war situation, less funds for propaganda were available and the Ministry of Propaganda left the German legation in Mexico City without instruction. Besides this, urgent and important letters or requests from the German legation remained unanswered, so that the German minister warned Berlin: "Three emergency calls for extraofficial finances for press and propaganda have not been answered yet. I urge you to change your attitude. Because of the lack of funds we are losing one newspaper after the other, which are now being bought by hostile interests. It would be a tragic mistake to think it is possible to persuade Mexican journalists with few gifts or personal information. In this country, all journalists largely expect cash and profit. Apparently the other side (i.e. United States) seems to understand this better and supplies the Mexican journalists more successfully than we do. Please answer immediately so that further gains will not be lost. 43 " Despite this letter and further complaints, the attitude in Berlin did not change, which contributed to the decline of the German position in Mexico.
Finally, it is of particular interest if and how the Nazi government intervened in internal Mexican political affairs. Did the Third Reich exploit the tense atmosphere around the Mexican elections of 1940 for its own purposes? Furthermore it is interesting to see if a second Zimmermann Despatch existed and in which way a German Fifth Column played a certain role in Mexico during the Second World War.
Besides an economic interest in Mexico, Germany, particularly since the outbreak of the Second World War, saw in Mexico a base for its anti-United States propaganda, exploiting Mexican fear about the "Yankee imperialism" 44 . Thus the propaganda had a threefold task: to win the Mexicans for the Third Reich's points of view in regard to German politics, to keep Mexico distant from the United States and the Western hemisphere weak, and finally to support Latin America's neutrality in the war.
Before and during the war, the Deutsche Nachrichtenbüro and other Third Reich news agencies supplied the Mexican press with articles presenting international affairs in the Nazi point of view. Although press propaganda before the war had been quite successful 45 , the German propaganda experienced a decisive setback by the declaration of the German Press Attaché Mister Dietrich as persona non grata in Mexico in June 1940 46 . Also, as described before, a lack of funds weakened the German activities and more and more Mexican newspaper turned to the propaganda of the allied forces. As early as in May of 1940 Minister Rüdt had cabled to Berlin that allied propaganda was taking former German strongholds.
From the time of the German attack on Russia on, the German legation and its propaganda had lost all influence. He cabled to Berlin: and all Mexican claims on British Honduras are a matter for Mexico and Guatemala to resolve.
49 " These two examples show that although the Third Reich had several opportunities to exploit opposition forces in Mexico for its own interests, the German Foreign Ministry did not plan to interfere in internal Mexican affairs.
The other important area of German activities in Mexico was espionage and information -gathering about allied forces in Mexico. However, the German documents do not reveal enough to win a complete picture about the extent and impact of these activités. The FBI records would still have to be consulted. Until today it can be said that the German legation served as main center of communication for the espionage activities and served as a shelter for German agents in Mexico.
Several groups were involved in the German espionage system: the Abwehr, the German Secret Police and informants of the German legation in Mexico City. However, they worked rather uncoordinated and battled for influence among eachother, so that these rivalries decisively affected their effectiveness. Whenever possible the German minister restricted their activities.
From the outbreak of the war on, the United States embassy in Mexico City was well informed about German espionage activities and often countered the German plans 50 . The rivalries between the involved German groups became such an obstacle that in May, 1940 a German special envoy to the United States and Mexico cabled to Berlin: "The stupidity of the German agents threatens the entire organization.
51 "
Although the German minister repeatedly had asked for energetic actions against the allied counter espionage in Mexico, the lack of finances and the rivalries between the groups made it impossible to act successfully against the British and United States secret service. Furthermore, the German community in Mexico was by no means homogeneous. Although the Third Reich successfully set all the institutions of the community on an equal footing, the community never united behind the ideology of the Third Reich. The community was divided over political issues which precluded Nazi Germany and thus could have never worked as base for a German Fifth Column. Although a possible German support of the Mexican Sinarquista movement and the Falangist still needs more research in order to win an overall picture of German activities in Mexico during the Second World War, it is already clear that no German plan or efforts existed to undermine Mexico for National Socialist purposes. Thus the often feared Fifth Column in Mexico did not exist.
Conclusion
The relationship between Germany and Mexico during the Second World War was baised mainly on economic interests. The German export of manufactured goods and machinery for projects of the Mexican government ceased with the beginning of the Second World War. Contrary to the existing academic opinion, German exports to Mexico did not cease because of the British blockade, but rather because of Germany's inability to resolve domestic problems resulting from a war industry and its impact on the involved companies and agencies.
The political relationship between Mexico and the Third Reich continued after the breakdown of the economic relations. This was due mainly to the fact that until June, 1941 Mexico was anticipating a final German victory in Europe, which then would have controlled a prosperous West-European market which would have needed the Mexican raw materials. When it became clear that this expectation would not be realized, Mexico did not hesitate to turn to the United States and enter a close cooperation both economically and politically. This cooperation had been tentatively prepared from the outbreak of the Second World War on.
The Mexican-German political relationship had two faces. A public one, whereby Mexico officially was adverse to Nazi Germany, and an unofficial one, where the Mexican attitude toward Nazi Germany was much more open and cooperative than the public line would have allowed. Until June, 1941 Mexico was much more an ambigious than a good neighbor to the United States and its policy of hemispheric defense and solidarity.
The German political attitude towards Mexico was sustained by the intention to appease the United States and to keep hemispheric solidarity weak. However, the German-Mexican relationship declined until its end in May, 1942 without any resistance or action from the German side. It watched the relationships downfall silently.
The often suspected and feared German Fifth Column in Mexico was more a construct of propaganda and counter-propaganda. German espionage and agent activities were surveilled by the allied intelligence services and successfully destroyed until the Fall of 1940. No coordinated effort of German forces existed which might have prepared Mexico for a takeover by the Nazi government 54 .
M ) This paper was given at a lecture at the Ibero-American Institute Preußischer Kulturbesitz Foundation, West-Berlin, in July, 1984. 
